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Introduction
The large scale of privatization of assets, such as spectrum licenses, and gas and electricity supply, attracts attention to multi-object auctions (see e.g. Krishna and Perry (2000) ; Ausubel (2004) ). Unlike the auctioning of non-government owned assets, the efficiency of the allocation, rather than revenue maximization, is the main objective of these auctions (see McMillan (1994) ; Ausubel and Cramton (1999) ; Cramton (2002) ).
This objective may be achieved at the auction stage or by allowing post auction trade among bidders.
As a means of allocating objects efficiently, Vickrey auctions are often considered. The attractiveness of a Vickrey auction is that it extracts the true value of the bidders via simple strategies that are independent of the underlying distribution of values (see Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) ). On the other hand, conducting a Vickrey auction, explaining its pricing rule and its transparency to the bidders, can be quite complex, especially when there are large packages of objects and many bidders. Due to these complexities, most spectrum auctions in the US do not allow for package bidding and, in rare cases, such as a 700MHz auction, allow bids on only a limited number of packages (Cramton (2002) ). Running simultaneous second-price auctions may be more practical but may lead to inefficient allocations when complementarities exist (see de Vries and Vohra (2003) ; Cramton et al. (2006) ). In that case, bidders are naturally interested in resale at the conclusion of the auction.
Post auction trades among bidders are observed in various settings, such as auctions of antiques, real estate, art, emission allowances, or spectrum licenses. In government auctions, where one would expect the government to be able to forbid resale, it is hard to prevent companies from merging (as was the case after the UK spectrum auctions in 2000 and 2003) 2 . Therefore, it is important to understand both theoretically and empirically how auction outcomes are affected by the existence of resale markets.
Various studies have shown that, typically, auction behavior is affected by the possibility of resale and therefore the efficiency and revenue of the auction may change depending on the existence of resale markets (see e.g. Haile (1999 Haile ( , 2000 Haile ( , 2001 Haile ( , 2003 , Gupta and Lebrun (1999) , Hafalir and Krishna (2008) , Zheng (2002) , Garratt and Tröger (2006) ).
When multi-objects are auctioned, bidders' demands may differ depending on how large or small they are. For example, in FCC auctions, some bidders are smaller than others because of geographical restrictions or financial constraints, or because they have different uses for the objects. Therefore, they prefer to bid on only a small number of licenses. Moreover, in spectrum auctions (as well as in many other settings), large companies might value multiple licenses to serve large geographical locations more than the sum of the values of each license because the marginal cost of serving a larger area can be lower. In our model, we consider one large bidder (the global bidder) and N small bidders (the local bidders). There are N units to be sold. The global bidder is interested in all units, and each local bidder is interested in a single unit (see Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) , and Chernomaz and Levin (2012) for similar settings 3 ). The valuations of the bidders are independent and private. This setup resembles the situation of telecommunications firms interested in radio-frequencies in different areas, which might have independent valuations due to the varying demands in different geographical regions.
We study both Vickrey auctions where package bidding is allowed and simultaneous second-price auctions where an auction is conducted for each unit. We consider the case where resale among bidders is allowed and the case where it is not. The resale markets, when they are allowed, are designed so that the winners of the auction can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the unsuccessful bidders as in Hafalir and Krishna (2008) .
3 Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) develop this model in order to study the FCC auctions of licenses for the radio-frequency spectrum. Chernomaz and Levin (2012) study theoretically and experimentally first-price auctions in this setting. Neither of these models allows for post-auction resale.
We show that the Vickrey auction with package bidding has an equilibrium that allocates objects efficiently at the auction stage with or without resale possibility.
Particularly, truthful value bidding is equilibrium when resale is allowed. Hence, resale trade will not occur after a Vickrey auction in that equilibrium. On the other hand, simultaneous second-price auctions do not allocate the objects efficiently at the auction stage when resale is possible or prohibited in any equilibrium. Moreover, in any equilibrium of these auctions, full efficiency cannot be achieved by resale.
Based on these theoretical findings, it is important to investigate experimentally the tradeoff between running a complex but efficient Vickrey auction, and a simple but inefficient simultaneous second-price auction. First, our Vickrey auction experiments with or without resale do not achieve efficiency. The complexity of this pricing rule makes it hard for the subjects to discover that simple efficient equilibrium. Additionally, our experiments compare simultaneous second-price auctions when resale is allowed and not allowed in terms of efficiency. We show that the presence of resale markets diminishes the efficiency rates at the auction stage of the second-price format compared to the no-resale case. However, in this format, after resale, efficiency rates improve to the level of the outcome of our Vickrey auctions without resale experiments.
Although revenue may not be the main concern of government auctions, resale activity is typically considered a loss of the seller from the gains of trade. Contrary to this intuition, our experiments show that the resale possibility does not affect seller's revenue significantly in second-price auctions.
The existing models of auctions with resale in the literature mainly consider single object problems. The literature on auctions with resale provides six main reasons for resale: (i) New information regarding the values of objects arrives after the auctions (see Haile (1999 Haile ( , 2000 Haile ( , 2001 Haile ( , 2003 and Gupta and Lebrun (1999) ), (ii) new buyers arrive after the auction is over (Haile (1999) ), (iii) asymmetry in the auction may lead to inefficient allocation (Zheng (2002) ; Hafalir and Krishna (2008) ), (iv) presence of speculators in the auction (Garratt and Tröger (2006) ; Pagnozzi (2007 Pagnozzi ( , 2009 Pagnozzi ( , 2010 ), (v) coordination on collusive outcome (Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009)) , and (vi) misperception of resale markets (Georganas (2011) The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and states the theoretical results that motivate the experiments. Section 3 summarizes the experimental design and findings. Section 4 concludes. The proofs of the statements presented in the theoretical section and the instructions used in the experiments can be found in the online Appendix.
Model
Our setup is similar to the model introduced by Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) (see also Chernomaz and Levin (2012) , and Goeree and Lien (2012) Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) ) and with (as in Chernomaz and Levin (2012) ) satisfy all the aforementioned assumptions.
The objects are first auctioned to the bidders and then the bidders may trade the objects with each other at a post-auction resale stage when it is allowed (we will study auctions with and without resale possibility).
Auction Stage
We study two types of auction formats:
• Simultaneous Second-Price Auctions: simultaneous auctions are run, one for each market. In market , local i and global submit their bids. The highest bidder receives object i and pays the losing bid (the second highest bid) of that market.
when there is resale possibility. Allowing this kind of speculative bidding may lead to having many buyers at the resale stage and hence complicate the post auction trading. Additionally, in reality, some restrictions, such as geographical or legal, may prevent such speculative bidding. Therefore, we rule out this possibility. 5 Given the auction formats that we analyze, this assumption is made to simplify the notation.
• Vickrey Auction 6 : objects are sold in one auction. Local i submits a bid for object i; the global submits bids for each possible package of objects. The objects are allocated to those bidders who have the highest total bids for all the auctioned objects. Each winner pays a price that is equivalent to the externality she exerts on other bidders.
Independent of the auction format, all bids are disclosed after the auctions. 
Resale Stage
After the auction stage is completed, each winner may offer a price at which to sell the object to the losing bidder of the corresponding market (as in, e.g. Hafalir and
Krishna (2008)). These take-it-or-leave-it offers cannot be negotiated. If an offer is accepted, the trade takes place at the offered price. If it is rejected, the winner of the auction keeps the object. The timing of the offers is as follows 8 : If the global wins all the objects, she makes simultaneous offers to the losing locals. If the locals win objects and the global wins objects, first the winning locals make offers to the global, sequentially. The order of the locals' offers is randomly determined, and every local observes each offer as it occurs. After the global sees n offers that are made to her, and before deciding whether to accept them, the global makes simultaneous offers to losing locals. After all the offers are made, first the losing locals decide whether to accept 6 This is equivalent to the second-price auction when a single object is auctioned. It is considered the appropriate generalization of the second-price auction for multi-object settings (see e.g. Krishna 2002 ). 7 In these auctions the losing bids are, naturally, disclosed to the winners because the losing bids determine the prices that the winner pays. When the global wins all the objects or none of the objects, announcing the winning bids reveals redundant information since the winner sets the price in the resale stage (see the description of the resale stage). Although observing all winning bids may potentially affect a local's offer in the resale stage when global wins in other markets, in Table 8 we see that this information is not a significant variable affecting the resale price of the local.
or reject, then the global observes these decisions and decides whether to accept or reject the offers that are made to her.
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Throughout the paper, we study Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. It is common knowledge among bidders whether or not a resale stage will follow the auction.
Simultaneous Second-Price Auctions with and without Resale
When there are no complementarities between objects and resale is not allowed, it is well known that sincere signal bidding is an efficient equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies. Our first observation states that when complementarities exist, there is no equilibrium in which goods are allocated efficiently at the auction stage. This is true regardless of whether resale is allowed or not.
The equilibrium bid strategies are denoted by where is the bid of local i with signal , and is the bid of global in market i when she has signal . Consequently, any equilibrium that is monotone and symmetric will be efficient (in particular, sincere bidding). Under complementarities, however, the efficiency of the 9 Although we commit to this resale protocol in the theoretical model and the experimental design, our results on auctions with resale, Propositions 2 and 3, hold if instead losing bidders make the resale offers or the proposer of the resale offer is randomly determined at the resale stage. Moreover, even if the global bidder is allowed to make conditional offers in the resale stage, the theoretical results still hold. Although it is experimentally possible that global bidder who wins both objects may end up selling only one object at a low price while expecting to sell both at a profitable level, such an exposure problem is observed very rarely (only 1.57% in SPR and 1.62% in VR). Nevertheless, it is important to note that such global bidders might have set a price anticipating this exposure problem in the resale stage. One may investigate whether the bidders take into account the potential exposure problem in the resale stage by running a treatment by allowing for conditional offers.
whole game is entangled. Although the bidding strategies must depend only on the bidders' own signals, the efficient allocation in market might depend on the realization of signals in other markets.
This result indicates that the auction stage is inefficient, but it is not clear whether or not allowing for resale will lead to efficient allocation eventually. Next, we show that any equilibrium of the SP auctions with resale will be inefficient in the final outcome (after the resale stage).
Proposition 2. The simultaneous second-price auction with resale has no efficient equilibria.
The idea of the proof of Proposition 2 is that if a small downward deviation by a bidder who loses inefficiently for some realization of signals was not beneficial, then her upward deviations would be beneficial. This means that the bid strategy of a bidder cannot be strictly monotone for signal ranges where she may lose inefficiently. Hence, whenever a bidder loses the auction inefficiently, the winner could not infer the loser's value from her bid. Such a "ratchet effect" as studied by Laffont and Tirole (1988) has been applied to auctions by Lebrun (2010) and Xu, Levin and Ye (2012) . The techniques used in the literature are not applicable to our setting because we have multiple auctions at the same time. Our proof uses a vector calculus technique extensively used in physics.
This technique is novel in auction theory and might be found useful in other applications.
Proposition 2 implies that this game does not have a separating equilibrium. As can be seen from the proof, this means that the equilibrium bid functions should have some pooling portion. Moreover, this result is robust to the resale protocols where losing bidders make the resale offer, the proposer is randomly determined, the global makes the first offers when she wins only some of the objects, or the global is allowed to make contingent resale offers. The exact nature of the resale protocol is irrelevant for this result because it is a proof by contradiction where we assume that the auction bids reveal the signals of the bidders whenever the auction outcome is inefficient. This implies that the bidders know the nature of the efficient trade and which prices are acceptable or not at the resale stage of such equilibrium. Those different resale protocols affect the resale price but not the post trade allocation of objects (because in the proof by contradiction the final allocation is always assumed to be the efficient one). Since the proof does not particularly rely on the resale price, the arguments still hold under these alternative protocols. of these equilibria, the after resale allocation will be inefficient with positive probability.
The two equilibria characterized in Remark 1 are completely uninformative at the auction stage, and they are "collusive" in the sense that the bidders should somehow coordinate on who bids zero. Since the theory predicts impossibility of a separating equilibrium or any other equilibrium with a stronger solution concept (such as dominant strategy), coordination on one of the pooling or partially pooling equilibria will be unrealistic to expect from the subjects in our experiments. Nevertheless, the theory predicts inefficiency, and experiments can help us understand the severity of this inefficiency.
Vickrey Auction with and without Resale
In the auction stage, a single auction is run to sell all the objects. Each bidder submits bids for all possible packages of the objects that she is interested in. In our setup, this means that each local submits a bid for object and the global bidder submits bids for each package. The auction allocates the objects to the bidders who have the highest combined bids for all objects. Each winner pays a price that is equivalent to the externality she exerts on other competing bidders (Vickrey (1961) If resale is not allowed after the auction, it is known that a Vickrey auction has an efficient equilibrium (Vickrey (1961) ). In this equilibrium, value bidding is a weakly dominant strategy. 10 In Proposition 3, we show that when there is resale possibility, a
Vickrey auction still has an efficient equilibrium. Although bidding true valuation for each package remains an equilibrium strategy for the auction stage, it is no longer a weakly dominant one.
Proposition 3. The Vickrey auction with resale has an equilibrium that allocates the objects efficiently in the auction stage.
The proof of Proposition 3 constructs this efficient equilibrium where local bids , and the global bids for a package . Hence, the auction outcome is efficient, and no resale will occur. It is important to note that this result is robust to aforementioned alternative resale protocols.
Experiment
In the previous section, we saw that a Vickrey auction has an efficient equilibrium with and without resale. On the other hand, simultaneous second-price auctions may allocate the objects inefficiently at the auction stage whether there is a resale possibility or not. Furthermore, the existence of resale markets does not guarantee the efficiency of the final outcome. Our experiment is designed to study the following: (1) Comparisons of the efficiency rates in SP and Vickrey auctions with and without resale; (2) Sources of 10 A Vickrey auction has other equilibria as shown in the literature (see Blume et al. (2009)) . Similarly, when resale is allowed, there are implausible equilibria. As noted in Blume et al. (2009) , in any equilibrium, except the value bidding equilibrium, the bidders need to coordinate on who bid zero similar to the equilibria of SPR discussed in Remark 1.
efficiency losses when there are any; (3) Rankings of formats by the bidders and the seller.
Design of the Experiment
The experiments were run at the Experimental Economics Lab at the University of Maryland (EEL-UMD). All participants were undergraduate students. The experiment involved four treatments: simultaneous second-price auctions without resale (SPNR), simultaneous second-price auctions with resale (SPR), Vickrey auctions without resale (VNR), and Vickrey auctions with resale (VR). We conducted six sessions for each auction format. In each session, there were 15 subjects. No subject participated in more than one session. Therefore, we had 360 subjects. The random draws were balanced in the sense that we used the same sequence of random number "seed" signals for all auction formats, so that the random draws matched across treatments. A new set of random draws was used for each session in each format. Participants were seated in isolated booths. Each session lasted less than two hours. The instructions are provided in the Appendix. To test the subjects' understanding of the instructions, they had to answer a quiz before the experiment started. The auctions did not begin until each subject answered all of the questions correctly.
In each session, each subject participated in 30 auctions. Each subject was assigned a role, global or local, and the roles remained fixed throughout the session. Each auction had one global and two locals who were randomly matched. Two objects were auctioned. The global bidder was interested in both objects and each local was interested in a single object. More specifically, local 1 was interested in the object sold in Market 1 and local 2 was interested in the object in Market 2. Bidders were randomly re-matched after each auction. All bidding was anonymous. Bids were entered via computer. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007) ). At the conclusion of each auction, the bidders learned the outcome of the auction (i.e. whether the global or a local won in each market and the submitted bids).
At the beginning of an auction, each bidder received a private signal from uniform distribution on [0,100], independently. The signal of a local was her valuation for the object that she was interested in. The signal of a global was her valuation of the single object. A global's valuation for the package of two objects was 3×(her signal).
In treatments without resale possibility, the payoff of a subject in a round was the difference between the value of the object(s) that she received in the auction and the auction price. In treatments with resale possibility, a subject earned
Payoff = (Value of the object(s) owned after resale) + (any amount received in a resale trade) -(any amount paid in auction or resale stage).
All the amounts in the experiment were in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). It is immediate to show that, when resale is not allowed, truthful value bidding is the local bidders' weakly dominant strategy. Only the global bidder has a non-trivial problem. Proposition 4 shows how the equilibrium can be constructed in this case for the parameters used in the experiment. For each object she wins, the global pays the local bidder's bid in that market.
Simultaneous Second-Price Auctions and Vickrey Auctions with Resale (SPR and VR):
The auction stages of SPR and VR were the same as SPNR and VNR, respectively. After the auction stage was over, the bidders learned all the bids in each market and the resale stage started. Non-negotiable resale offers were made by the winners of the auction stage.
In the experiment, in order to decrease the number of decisions to be made, all the winners of the auction stage were asked to make resale offers. Note that a winner who did not want to sell could always ask for an unacceptable resale price. 11 If a resale trade took place, then the object was transferred to the buyer, the buyer paid, and the seller received the resale price. The timing of the resale offers was as follows:
• If the global won in both markets, then she made simultaneous offers to the locals.
Upon observing the resale offers, the locals simultaneously decided whether to accept or reject the corresponding offer.
• If the two locals won the auctions, then one randomly determined local made the first resale offer; after observing this, the other local made an offer. After observing both locals' offers, the global decided whether to buy any object(s) in the resale stage.
11 Although subjects were not explicitly told what an unacceptable resale price was, the subjects made unacceptable offers when they did not want to sell. 300ECU was the highest unacceptable offer for our parameters and subjects offered that price a few times (We observed resale price of 300 in 48 and 32 out of 900 auctions in SPR and VR, respectively).
• If local i won the auction in market i, and the global won the auction in market j, then first local i made a resale offer. After observing this, the global made a resale offer to local j. Then local j decided whether to accept the global's offer. Upon observing this, the global bidder decided whether to accept the local i's offer. All the moves in the sequential resale game described above were observable by the players.
Experimental Results
We start our analysis by considering the efficiency of the allocation in each treatment. We use the efficiency measure of Kagel and Levin (2001) . In this definition, the efficiency of an auction is measured as the ratio of the total surplus of the allocation to the highest possible surplus among all possible allocations, where total surplus is the sum of bidder profit and auctioneer revenue. Then, for each auction, the ratio is normalized by the average surplus of all possible allocations as follows: Table 1 presents the efficiency rates for each auction format for all periods as well as the first and second halves of the experiment. For the pairwise comparisons of the efficiencies we run Mann-Whitney rank tests. Based on all periods' data, at the auction stage, SPR achieves significantly lower efficiency rates than VNR and SPNR (z=-9.067; p= 0.0000 and z= -6.990; p=0.0000, respectively). However, after the resale stage, the efficiency rate of SPR is significantly higher than that of SPNR (z= 3.706; p= 0.0002) and is not significantly different from that of VNR (z= 1.031; p= 0.3024). Note that in SPR, VNR and SPNR, the efficiency rates improve in the second half of the experiments; nevertheless, these efficiency comparisons are preserved. The difference between the efficiencies of VNR and SPNR is significant in the overall data (z= 2.585; p= 0.0098).
However, due to learning in SPNR, this difference becomes insignificant when we look at the last 15 periods (z=1.004; p=0.3154).
VR achieves lower efficiency rates than other formats. We believe this is due to 12 Appendix B also includes all the analysis restricted to the second half of the experiment for all the formats. As can be seen, the main results of the paper are not affected qualitatively.
Recall that the equilibrium of VNR is efficient. However, the efficiency rate in the experiment is significantly less than 1 (p=0.0000, one-sided t-test). This lack of efficiency is actually not surprising in Vickrey auction experiments (see Kagel and Levin (2011) for a detailed survey). Particularly, overbidding in single-object Vickrey auctions (see e.g. Kagel and Levin (1993) ) and underbidding or truthful value bidding in multiobject Vickrey auctions (see Chen and Takeuchi (2010) ) have been reported. Although the demand of each bidder is symmetric in the corresponding literature, our results extend these findings such that local bidders who are interested in only a single object overbid, while global bidders who are interested in two objects bid truthfully or underbid. For the draws used in the experiment, the equilibrium efficiency rate of SPNR stated in Proposition 4 is 0.95, but the efficiency rate in the experiment is significantly less (p=0.0000, one-sided t-test). For SPR, we calculate the expected efficiency rate for the pooling equilibrium characterized in Remark 1 by the following simulation exercise. We assume that locals bid zero and the global with any signal always wins the auctions and sets the rational resale price of given that the auction stage is uninformative.
Then, we calculate the expected efficiency rate based on five million signal draws by using the parameters of the experiment. Such a pooling equilibrium leads to an efficiency rate of 0.77, which is significantly less than what we observed in the experiments (p= 0.0061, two-sided t-test).
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Next we investigate the sources of the inefficiencies. The first three columns of Tables 2-4 present the number of auctions where the efficient outcome allocates both objects to the locals (column 1), one object to a local and one object to the global (column 2), and both objects to the global (column 3). The rows of Tables 2-4 classify actual allocations based on the type of winning bidders: both locals receive an object in the experiment per treatment (row 1), one local and the global receive one object each (row 2), and the global receives both objects (row 3). auctions. In 72 (12.5%) auctions one object is inefficiently allocated to a local, and in 89 (15.5%) of them both objects are inefficiently allocated to the locals. Note that, in Table   4 , we classify the efficiency rates at the auction stage and at the resale stage separately.
The percentages of efficient allocations at the auction stage are 40.6% when the globals do not win any auction, 31.2% when the globals win only one auction, and 28.2% when the globals win both of the auctions. Similarly after the resale, those percentages are 32.9%, 18.1% and 49%, respectively.
Tables 2-4 demonstrate that the major source of inefficiency in all the formats arises from allocating an object to a local bidder inefficiently. For example, in VNR, when one local and the global should receive one object each, in 44.4% of the auctions both locals receive the objects inefficiently. Similarly, when both of the objects need to be allocated to the global, in 28% (12.5%+15.5%) of the auctions at least one local receives an object inefficiently. However, when locals should receive both objects efficiently, this happens 89.7% of the time. The main reason for the local bidders to win inefficiently is due to their aggressive bidding strategy. In the next subsection, we analyze the bidding behavior of the local and global bidders in detail and show that while locals overbid, the globals do not.
The lowest efficiency rate is observed in the auction stage of the SPR. This is mainly due to the observed inefficiencies when the global should have received both objects for the outcome to be efficient. In only 42.4% of these auctions does the global win both auctions. Given that under the complementarities the global should receive the package efficiently for most of the draws (in 576 out of 900 auctions), the loss of efficiency in this case affects the overall efficiency rate of SPR at the auction stage. At the resale stage of SPR, the locals who win the auction inefficiently sell the objects to the global, and the efficiency rate of SPR improves to VNR's rate. In all formats, the median bids as well as the frequencies of winning are nondecreasing with signals. This is in line with the monotone strategy of VNR and SPNR;
however, it also indicates that neither the locals nor the global are using the pooling equilibrium strategies described in Remark 1 in SPR. In Figures 1-3 , we plot the raw data, the linear regression as well as the mean and median of bids conditional on signals for each format.
In VNR, although value bidding is the weakly dominant strategy for both the global and the locals, the global is indifferent among bids in a range for certain realization of signals provided that the locals bid their signal. In Figure 1 , the equilibrium is not drawn for those signals. In particular, for signals above 50, the global is indifferent among any bids less than her signal for single-object. In the data, 80.5% of the global's single bids are below her signal when the global's signal is above 50. Similarly, for signals above 66, she is indifferent among any bids more than 200 for the two-object package. Of the globals with signals higher than 66, 77.1% bid more than 200 for twoobject packages. Note also that both mean and median curves are almost linear up to signal 50 in single-object bids of the global in Figure 1 , and they are non-linear and below the 45 degree line for signals above 50. Similarly, the mean and median in the package bids of the global are almost linear up to signal 66, and they are above 200 after signal 66.
The bid regressions for VNR are presented in Table 5 . The global's two-object package bids are in line with the theoretical prediction. In the regression analysis restricted to signals less than 67, the test of the constant being zero and the coefficient of the signal being equal to 3 is not rejected (p=0.170). The global's single-object bids are mostly less than the value of the single object. We reject the hypothesis that the coefficient of the signal is significant and equal to 1 and the rest is zero in the regression for the globals' single-object bids (p=0.000). On the other hand, locals tend to bid more than the equilibrium prediction. In Table 5 , the coefficient of the signal is more than 1 for the local (p=0.000). This can be explained by joy of winning (see e.g. Cooper and Fang (2008) ).
The joy of winning has an interesting implication for the global bidders in VNR.
For example, say the global's signal is 30, and the locals bid 10 and 70. If the global bids truthfully, she wins only one item, but by underbidding for the single items, she will win two items. Assuming that she enjoys winning two items more than winning one item, she may want to underbid on single item and not do so on the package. This is what we see in our VNR data. Nevertheless, while joy of winning explanation would predict overbidding for the packages as well, as in Chen and Takeuchi (2010), we do not observe overbidding in the package bids. The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. * <0.10, ** < 0.05, and *** <0.01. N 1800 850 The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. * <0.10, ** < 0.05, and *** <0.01. Figure 2 shows the behavior in SPNR. The locals bid more aggressively than theory predicts. For local bidders, the coefficient of the signal is significantly higher than 1 in the regressions in Table 6 (p=0.00). This is also consistent with the joy of winning explanation.
By Proposition 4, for the parameters used in the experiment, the equilibrium strategy of the global is as follows: for signals higher than 50, any bid on the interval out of 1800 global bids were 300. 14 We observe that the locals bid more than their value.
Additionally, bidding more than one's value is more pronounced in the SPR format compared to the SPNR (p=0.000 by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). On the other hand, the bids of the global in SPR are less than those in SPNR (p=0.000 by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). One reason for this might be that, given the aggressive behavior of the locals in SPR, the global wants to lower her bid to make the locals think that her value is not much and hence get a lower resale prices from them.
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The literature considers nonzero bids of bidders with zero values as speculation since zero valued bidders are the only bidders who are bidding solely to benefit from the resale activity (see e.g. Garratt and Tröger (2006) 15 This explanation is supported by the price regressions in Table 8 where a local's resale price offer increases with the bid of global when the global needs to buy the second object in the resale stage. 16 The box plots are created using standard techniques. The box represents the interquartile range (IQR); the whiskers extend to the furthest point within 1.5×IQR; the horizontal line in a box represents the median.
format. On the other hand, the globals' median bids for any signal bin above 20 are significantly lower in SPR than in SPNR. those who asked for resale prices above their own valuation) is 91.7%, and the percentage of rational acceptance (i.e. acceptance of resale terms if and only if doing so was profitable) among all losing bidders is 95.5%. The high rate of rational acceptance of resale offers has been also reported in a context where the seller offers a take-it-or-leaveit price to the losing bidder for the sale of a second unit (see Salmon and Wilson (2008) Table 7 reports that higher resale prices are paid by the global when she buys the second object in the post-auction trade than when she goes to resale after losing both objects in the auction. The difference is significant (p=0.000 in the comparison of 70.1 and 84). This finding is intuitive because the locals know that the marginal utility of the second object to the global is higher than the value of single object due to complementarities and they try to extract the additional surplus generated when the global receives the second object. As another implication of the complementarities, after the auctions where only one object is received by the global, the resale price is higher when the global buys than when she sells (p=0.000 in the comparison of 84 and 42).
Similarly, when the global offers resale price for both objects, she charges a higher price than that when she sells only one object (p=0.023 in the comparison of 42 and 63.5). This is due to the additional value to the global of keeping an object when she has two versus one object. Table 8 reports the results of the regressions for the locals' resale offers. When the locals win both objects in the auctions, their offers are affected only by their own signals. However, when the locals win only one auction, the offer of the winning local depends not only on her own signal but also on the global's bid in the same market (how much this local paid in the auction) and the bid of the other local (how much the global paid in the other auction that she won). These results suggest that when the global gets only one object in the auction, the local who has the other object is aware that the global must buy it to enjoy the extra payoff of the complementary object. Hence, when setting the price, this power gives an additional motive to the local to take into account all the relevant information. For example, if the global's bid is high, she sets a high price to extract more from the global's payoff from the complementary objects; when the global's bid is low, she thinks that the global may sell it to the other local or be unwilling to pay a high price for the complementary object. The negative and significant coefficient of the other local's bid (i.e. how much the global paid in the market she won) in the third regression of Table 8 may be interpreted as follows: The higher bid by the other local may indicate a high value by that local and therefore the high probability of the global selling to that local rather than buying one more object. As a response, the offering local should lower her price in the resale if she wants the global to buy from her rather than sell to the other local. On the other hand, in the auction stage, if the global does not get any of the objects, a local is no longer the sole seller to the global, and the other local's price plays a role in the decision of the global as well. In this case, the locals just set a profitable price. The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. * <0.10, ** < 0.05, and *** <0.01. Table 9 reports the regression results for globals' resale offers for the offers not higher than 100. This is because we assume that any resale offer exceeding a price of 100 can only be made with the intent not to sell. In the regressions, the locals' bid is significant only when the global wins a single object. If a global offers a price less than 100 to sell the single object she has, she wants to extract as much as she believes she can from the losing local based on the information received from the auction stage. When the global wins both auctions and considers selling the objects, only her own signal is significant. In this case, there is room for an exposure problem because the global who aims to sell both objects may end up selling only one. To avoid this, the global sets profitable prices and increases the chance that both locals buy when she wants that. The games where the offers are less than or equal to 100. The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. * <0.10, ** < 0.05, and *** <0.01. Table 10 reports the average observed auction revenue in each treatment as well as the average revenue predicted by the equilibrium for the Vickrey auction and for SPNR, for the draws used in the experiment. Using the 6 independent sessions per treatment, the Mann-Whitney test is used to compare the revenues. There is no significant difference between actual auction revenues in the different formats (for Vickrey vs. SPNR, z= 0.320 and p= 0.749; for Vickrey vs. SPR, z= 0.801 and p=0.423; for SPNR vs.
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SPR: z=-0.961 and p=0.337). There is also no significant difference between the actual and predicted revenues of SPNR (z=1.363 and p=0.173). However, the actual revenue in Vickrey auctions is significantly higher than that predicted by the theory (z=1.992 and p=0.046).
The Vickrey format generates more revenue than its equilibrium prediction because the locals bid aggressively in the experiment, as argued earlier. Also, in SPR auctions, locals bid more aggressively, but globals bid less aggressively than they do in SPNR. Those behaviors have opposite effects on revenue and thus cancel each other out.
Hence, these two formats generated similar revenues in the experiment. 
Bidder's Payoff
Next we compare the formats from the bidders' perspective in Table 11 . Figure   6 ). Figure 7 highlights that the mean and median payoffs of local bidders with signals above 70 are statistically higher in SPR than those in the other two formats. 
Conclusion
We have studied multi-object auctions when post-auction resale among bidders is possible. Theoretically, Vickrey auctions (both with and without resale) have an efficient equilibrium; however, in any equilibrium of simultaneous second-price auctions (either with or without resale), the final allocation is not guaranteed to be efficient.
In spite of the theoretical attractiveness of the Vickrey format, in practice, simultaneous second-price auctions are used more often than Vickrey auctions. This is mainly due to the complexity of the Vickrey format (see e.g. Milgrom (1995), Rothkopf (2007)). It is notable that the Vickrey auction does not work so well even in a relatively simple environment. Experimental evidence highlights the trade-off between simple pricing rules that may lead to exposure problems and complex combinatorial auctions (see Bichler, et al. (2014 ), Brunner, et al (2010 ).
In our experiment, we took the efficiency rate of Vickrey as our benchmark, and analyzed the effect of resale on simultaneous second-price auctions. According to our results, although the possibility of resale decreases the efficiency rate in the auction stage of simultaneous second-price auctions, the final efficiency is improved to the observed efficiency rate in a Vickrey auction. Furthermore, in simultaneous second-price auctions, preventing resale hurts efficiency without changing the auction revenue, and allowing resale benefits the locals without diminishing the global bidder's expected payoff. Based on these results, we can conclude that when simultaneous second-price auctions are inevitable or preferred due to simplicity of their implementation, resale markets should be allowed. Nevertheless, in practice, the resale of objects usually leads to transaction costs in bargaining and delays in the actual use of the auctioned objects. It may be important to investigate the effect of such costs on auction stage efficiency rates.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature by combining theory and experiment. Our experiment highlights the importance of simplicity of the pricing rule that we cannot detect by simply focusing on the theoretical results. Along this line, perhaps rather than Vickrey auction, a simpler pricing rule, such as pay-as-bid package auctions, may be better for combinatorial auctions when resale is possible. We leave this fruitful exercise for future research.
